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The enlargement of the European monetary union to include new EU Member States (NMs) will not 
lead to higher expected inflation in the enlarged euro area, but only to some redistribution of inflation 
at the country level, if the policy framework of the monetary authority remains invariant. Shocks to the 
real exchange rate may affect instead aggregate inflation, if member countries’ economic structure 
differs. The numerical results indicate that the impact on steady state inflation of the current euro area 
is limited if participating countries are weighted on the basis of nominal GDP and if the upward 
pressure on the real exchange rate is postulated to be in line with most estimates of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect. In the event of real exchange rate or country-specific supply shocks in NMs, the 
consequences are found to be limited for the current and the enlarged euro area, but sizeable for the 
NMs themselves.  
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The inclusion of new Member States (NMs) in the European Union (EU), ten
in May 2004 and two more expected in 2007, has important policy implica-
tions for the euro area. It is one of the aims of the Community explicitly
set out in the Treaty to strengthen economic cohesion through the ultimate
adoption of a single currency, excluding any form of positive or negative dis-
crimination between EU Member States (the equality of treatment principle).
A tt h es a m et i m ea m o n gt h eg o a l so ft h eC o m m u n i t y ,t h eT r e a t yi d e n t i ￿es the
need to promote sustainable and non-in￿ationary growth, assigning to the Eu-
rosystem the primary objective of preserving price stability (the price stability
principle).
T h i sp a p e rs h o u l db es e e na sa na t t e m p tt oa s s e s st h e s eo b j e c t i v e s ,b y
studying the impact of EU enlargement on in￿ation and output in the context
of a simple modelling framework, which refers to the standard time inconsis-
tency literature initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon
(1983), and Rogoﬀ (1985), and recently applied to the case of currency unions
by Lane (2000), Alesina and Barro (2002), Berger (2002), Gros and Hefeker
(2002), and Ca￿ Zorzi and De Santis (2004).1
To examine the currency union issue, Ca￿ Zorzi and De Santis (2004) have
developed a general speci￿cation of the model by allowing diﬀerences in the
countries￿ economic structures. The model generalises Lane (2000), Berger
(2002) and Gros and Hefeker (2002) by introducing a deterministic and a
stochastic component to the real exchange rate. This approach is useful in the
context of enlargement, as it is consistent with the empirical and theoretical
￿nding that NMs￿ currencies tend to appreciate as a result of the catching-
1As in the papers by Lane (2000), Alesina and Barro (2002), Berger (2002) and Gross
and Hefeker (2002) we have adopted a static approach. It should be noted, however, that
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) have shown how to extend the single-country discretionary
case with rational expectation to a dynamic framework maintaining the typical results of
the Barro-Gordon setting. The model becomes more complex due the persistence parameter
of the AR(1) process, which characterises the supply shocks.
EUI-WP No. 2004/31 © 2004 Ca' Zorzi and De Santisup process (Grafe and Wyplosz, 1997; De Broeck and Slok, 2001; Frait and
Komarek, 2001; Halpern and Wyploz, 2001; Kovacs 2002, Egert, 2003;).
The model assumes three phases. In the pre-Maastricht phase, steady
state in￿ation depends on the monetary policy framework adopted in each
country. With a ￿exible exchange rate, steady state in￿a t i o ni nN M sw i l lb e
higher, the less credible the monetary policy framework and the ￿atter the
Phillips curve. In the case of a currency board regime instead, in￿ation is
partly imported from the anchor country and partly determined by the real
exchange rate appreciation process. The model is also consistent with the
view that the currency board regime may be suited to countries that need to
enhance the credibility of their monetary policy framework; whereas it poses
a number of risks if country-speci￿c supply shocks are deemed to be likely.
In the Maastricht phase, the model assumes that the in￿ation requirement
of the Treaty determines a radical change to the way in￿ationary expectations
are formed, consistent with the rapid achievement of the nominal convergence
objective. At the same time, the process of appreciation of the real exchange
rate in NMs exerts an upward pressure on the nominal exchange rate of NMs.
In the enlarged monetary union phase, the model suggests that average
in￿ation in the enlarged euro area is not aﬀected via the credibility channel or
via the real exchange rate appreciation process, provided that the monetary
policy framework is unchanged. Enlargement in this case simply results in a
diﬀerent distribution of in￿ation across countries, with a de￿ationary impact
on the euro area.
To gauge the magnitude of the eﬀects, this analytical framework is then
applied to ten NMs and the euro area. Several alternative scenarios are con-
sidered, in order to account for the uncertainty over the pace of the real ap-
preciation process in NMs and over the parameter values of the model.
The main insights of the numerical simulations can be summarised as fol-
lows. The impact of enlargement on steady state in￿a t i o no ft h ec u r r e n te u r o
Michele Ca' Zorzi and Roberto De Santis
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nominal GDP and if the upward pressure on the real exchange rate is pos-
tulated to be in line with most estimates of the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect.
However, the de￿ationary impact on the euro area is more sizeable if NMs are
weighted in terms of purchasing power parities and if a stronger real exchange
rate appreciation process is assumed.
With regard to shocks, the results depend on whether they are symmetric
or country-speci￿c. If supply shocks are symmetric, the response of in￿ation
and output in the enlarged currency area is very similar to that of the euro
area before enlargement, while the response in NMs is sensitive to the slope of
the Phillips curve. In the event of either country-speci￿c supply shocks in NMs
or real exchange rate shocks, the response of in￿ation and output is found to
be small in the enlarged currency area but sizeable in the NMs, irrespective
of the slope of the Phillips curve.
The remaining sections of the paper have been structured as follows: Sec-
tions 2 and 3 describe the model for NMs and the euro area; Section 4 examines
the consequences of the Maastricht phase under the hypothesis that entering
in the exchange rate mechanism is fully credible; Section 5 explores the con-
sequences of the enlargement of the euro area from both the point of view of
the NMs and the euro area; Section 6 presents the benchmark of the model,
and simulates the impact of institutional changes as well as of supply and real
exchange rate shocks; ￿nally, Section 7 provides the main conclusions.
2 Independent monetary policy
Consider a static -country Barro-Gordon (1983) model, de￿ned by a set
(a=1....n-1) of NMs, and the euro area n. The objective function of the
c e n t r a lb a n ki ne a c hc o u n t r y( i=1....n) is based upon the assumption that
monetary authorities dislike departures of actual output and in￿ation from
their respective optimal values. Thus, they minimise a quadratic loss function
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where  denotes actual output, ∗
 desired output,  actual in￿ation, ∗
 the
bliss point and  weights the cost of in￿ation relative to that of output.
De￿ne  ≥ 0 as the degree of distortions, market imperfections or tech-
nological gap that prevents countries from achieving their maximum potential
convergence vis-￿-vis the euro area (Beetsma and Jensen, 1999; and Berger,
2002). This parameter in the present framework will be referred to as the
￿convergence gap￿. We assume that the diﬀerence between desired output, ∗
 ,
and the natural rate, ,i saf r a c t i o n	 of the convergence gap, , where the
coeﬃcient 0 ≤ 	 ≤ 1 measures to what extent monetary authorities wish to
converge faster than the natural rate would allow for. In the extreme cases, if
	 =0 , the convergence gap does not have any in￿uence on the monetary policy
decision making process, so that ∗
 = ; if on the contrary 	 =1 , the conver-
gence gap entirely feeds into the monetary policy response, i.e. ∗
 =  + .
I nt h ec a s eo ft h ee u r oa r e a ,w ea s s u m et h a t	 =  =0 ;t h u s ,∗
 =  holds
always.
On the supply side, the deviation of output from its natural level, ,i s
positively related to unanticipated in￿ation:
 =  + 
 ( − 
)+ (2)
where 
 denotes expected in￿ation, 
 the output elasticity to in￿ation sur-







Events unfold as follows: the private sector forms expectations on prices,
conditionally on the information available at that time. The output shock is
realised and, ￿nally, monetary policy is set. Monetary authorities, therefore,
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game is solved by backward induction. Since ∗
 is higher than the natural
rate , the standard time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy arises.
Monetary authorities minimise the objective function (1) subject to (2).
Replacing (2) and ∗
 in (1) and diﬀerentiating with respect to  determines





























By imposing rational expectations on (3) yields the in￿ationary expectation

































To derive ex post output, replace (4) and (5) in (2). Then,

















Given (5), the in￿ation diﬀerential between NMs and the euro area is:
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In steady state the in￿ation diﬀerential between NMs and the euro area is
wider the larger the diﬀerence between ∗
 and ∗
 and if 	  0,t h el a r g e r
the distortion .
The analysis also allows us to get an insight on what are the determinants
of the nominal exchange rate. Let us assume that the real exchange rate of
the euro vis-￿-vis NMs￿ set of currencies is determined by factors exogenous
to the model.2 Although this restriction is not a necessary feature of the
model, both theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that, owing to
the catching up process, NMs￿ currency are bound to appreciate in real terms.3
The nominal depreciation of NMs￿ currencies vis-￿-vis the euro, de￿ned as
b  =  −  +  + , is therefore equal to:



















where   0 is the deterministic component of the real exchange rate appre-
c i a t i o no fN M sa n d is a shock to the real exchange rate with zero mean and
constant variance. In other words, NMs￿ currencies are expected to depreciate
in nominal terms, whenever the steady-state in￿ation diﬀerential is larger than
the real exchange rate appreciation, which is due to the catching-up process.
2Alesina and Barro (2002) generalise the one good model to allow countries to produce
diﬀerent market baskets of ￿nal goods by introducing a random error term, which was taken
to be serially independent with zero mean and constant variance and to be distributed
independently of countries￿ supply shocks.
3Whenever countries successfully catch up, productivity growth tends to be higher in the
tradable than in the non-tradable sector. Under a standard set of assumptions, this implies
that successfully catching up countries face a real exchange rate appreciation vis-a-vis trading
partners (Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964).
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Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria all adopt currency board regimes.4 How are
in￿ation and output be aﬀected in this case? Under the assumption of a
fully credible regime, the value of the in￿ation rate does not ensue from an
optimisation program.5 By ￿xing the exchange rate, 	
 =  − −,a n d









 −  − .( 9 )
Under a currency board, in￿a t i o ni nN M sd e p e n d so nb o t ht h ei m p a c to f
shocks aﬀecting the euro area and on real exchange rate movements determined
by the catching-up process. It should be noted that in￿ation no longer depends
on supply shocks aﬀecting NMs, because a pure currency board implicitly
prevents the monetary authorities from stabilising them. The output equation
becomes in fact the following:
	









If supply shocks are symmetric and 
 = 
, the impact on in￿ation and
output is the same as for the euro area. By contrast, if supply shocks aﬀect
only country , there is no response in terms of stabilisation by the mone-
tary authority and hence in￿ation remains unchanged whereas output absorbs
entirely the shock, . Foreign shocks may also have sizeable eﬀects on the
domestic economy. This can be seen for example by the positive relationship
between the variances of in￿ation and output in the NMs and the variance of
supply shocks in the euro area, 2
:
4Estonia and Lithuania also joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) on 28
June 2004, while maintaining the currency board arrangement in place, as a unilateral com-
mittment.
5See Alesina and Barro (2002) for a more in depth analysis of currency board regimes.
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Another interesting aspect is that, a priori at least, it is not possible to say
whether in￿ation is lower under a currency board regime or under ￿exible
exchange rates.6 Average in￿ation under the currency board regime (9) is
lower than that under the ￿exible exchange rate regime (5) if the real exchange




	. This regime therefore appears particularly suited to countries that
need to enhance the credibility of their monetary policy framework; whereas it
poses a number of risks if country-speci￿c supply or real exchange rate shocks
are thought to be likely.
4 Maastricht phase
Following accession, new member states participate in the EU co-ordination of
economic policies and, to the extent to which they have reached a sustainable
level of convergence, are expected to join the euro area provided they satisfy
the criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty.7 T h ei m p l i c a t i o n so ft h eM a a s -
tricht criteria on in￿a t i o na n do u t p u tc a nb es e e ni nt h el i g h to ft h ep r e s e n t
modelling framework. We assume that the policy makers decide to proceed
with a rapid process of nominal convergence to bring the in￿ation diﬀerential
6Cukierman, et al. (2002) found evidence that transition economies with currency boards
do not necessarely post lower in￿ation rates.
7This institutional framework was re-iterated on a number of occasions by the President
and Governing Council Board Members of the ECB. See for example: Central Banking
(2001), Interview: Otmar Issing, vol. 11, pp. 28-29.
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 We also assume that this strat-
egy is fully credible, as the pay oﬀ is deemed to be suﬃciently high. Then,











 + , (11)
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Examining ￿nally what determines the nominal exchange rate apprecia-
tion, we ￿nd that:
b 
 =  +  + .
While the in￿ation criterion is by assumption satis￿ed, there would be some
upward pressure on the nominal exchange rate if −( + )  ,w h i c h
would have to be dealt with in the context of the exchange rate mechanism. It
is useful contrasting this result to the currency board solution (9). In the latter
case, it is the in￿ation criterion that is not satis￿ed when −( + )  .
It can easily be shown that in the case of Maastricht supply shocks are
stabilised in the same way as for currency boards. However, the variances of
in￿ation and output diﬀer, as in the case of Maastricht the nominal exchange


































8This section does not fully account for the implications of the exchange rate mechanism
which only allows some degree of exchange rate ￿exibility.
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We now turn to consider the case where NMs join the monetary union, with













In￿ation, actual output and the natural output in the enlarged currency union
with  countries are expressed as a weighted average between the amounts





 and  =
P
, where the weights  are in-
terpreted as the size of country  relative to the enlarged currency area. The
in￿ation diﬀerential between any NM and the euro area is equal to the sum of
the deterministic and stochastic components of the real exchange rate appre-
ciation: 
 − 
 = −( + )
Likewise the diﬀerence between desired output and the natural rate is
de￿ned as ∗
 −  = 	 The timing of events is unchanged and the game
is solved as before. Replacing ,  and ∗
 into (13) and diﬀerentiating it
with respect to 
 determines the reaction function of the central bank as a
function of in￿ationary expectations. By imposing rational expectations one
can derive expected in￿ation. Finally, the equilibrium outcome is achieved by
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Provided that the NMs￿ real convergence objective does not in￿uence mon-
etary policy, i.e. ∀	 =0  then 	 =0 , the monetary policy framework
remains invariant (namely, ∗
 = ) and expected in￿ation at the steady state
is 
 = ∗
. It is also noticeable that expected in￿ation in the enlarged cur-
rency area is not aﬀected by anticipated developments in the real exchange
rates of NMs￿ currencies. However, aggregate in￿ation is aﬀected by real ex-
change rate shocks if 
 6= 
. To be more precise, a negative shock to 
would have a positive (negative) impact on in￿ation if the slopes of the Phillips
curves of NMs are on average steeper (￿atter) relative to the euro area. For
example, an unanticipated increase in non-tradable prices in NMs by causing
a temporary appreciation of the real exchange rate,   0, would increase
aggregate in￿ation if the output elasticity to in￿ation surprises in NMs is on
average smaller than that in the euro area, (i.e. 

 ). This implies that if
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy diﬀers among member states,
shocks to relative prices, whether the consequence of a relative productiv-
ity shock or a change in world demand for domestic goods, aﬀect aggregate
in￿ation in the currency area.
To highlight any potential eﬀect of a departure from the current monetary
policy framework in the euro area, we also examine an additional case, whereby
monetary policy in the enlarged euro area would account for the desire of NMs
to converge in real terms. In this case, ∗
 =  +
P
∗
. As a corollary,
it can easily be shown that 	 =
P
	, which would imply a positive
in￿ation bias, potentially threatening the price stability mandate (see (14)).
It also highlights how the in￿ationary impact of enlargement is neutralised if
The Eastward Enlargement of the European Union
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In addition to the impact on average in￿ation, this framework also allows
us to get an insight on the distribution of in￿ation. Average in￿ation will be
higher in NMs than in the original euro area, following the assumption that
NMs are characterised by an appreciating trend −.I n ￿ation will be higher




Output in the euro area and NMs is represented by the following set of
equations:



























































The equations derived for in￿ation and output suggest the following. Following
a real exchange rate shock in￿ation and output co-move in every country. At
the union level, however, aggregate output and aggregate in￿ation move in
opposite directions, as monetary authorities tend to oﬀset the in￿ationary (or
de￿ationary) impact of the shock. Say  is a small number. Then the impact
of a country-speci￿cs h o c k s ,, is almost entirely re￿ected in terms of changes
in the output of country  A real exchange rate shock, , has sizeable eﬀects
in country ,w i t hi n ￿ation and output moving in the same direction. It is
interesting to note, how, both types of shocks have a limited impact on the
euro area. Conversely if a shock takes place in the euro area, ,t h ee ﬀects on
NMs are sizeable. Given the closed form solutions calculated in the previous
section, it is relatively straightforward to derive the variances of in￿ation and
output in the enlarged euro area:
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Therefore, the variances of in￿ation and output depend on the following
factors. First, they are a positive function of the variances of supply shocks in
each member country. These variances, however, are weighted by the square
of the share of the size of each participant to the union. A relatively high
variance of shocks in one country may therefore have a limited impact on the
union insofar as this country is not too large.9 Second, they are an increasing
function of the variance of the real exchange rate, 2

. The impact will be
greater the more the participants to the common currency area diﬀer in supply
structure, as measured by the wedge 
 − 
. In the speci￿cc a s ew h e r et h e
slope of the aggregate supply is the same (
 = 
), the variance of in￿ation
and output of the currency union is not aﬀected by the stochastic ￿uctuations
of the real exchange rates. Third, they depend positively on the degree of
correlation between supply shocks, (). This is quite intuitive as the more
closely supply shocks are correlated, the less they are likely to oﬀset each other.









0, it increases if (

	)  0. This implies, for example, that if NMs are
characterised by the same slope of the Phillips curve, then the variance of
in￿ation and output increases if  and  are positively correlated.
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The analytical framework developed in the previous section is applied to the
euro area and ten NMs (eight central and eastern European countries, which
recently joined the EU, plus Romania and Bulgaria, which are expected to
join in 2007). The analysis aims at providing an insight on the size of the
impacts of institutional change and of supply and real exchange rate shocks
under alternative scenarios.
6.1 The benchmark
Table 1 shows the benchmark dataset, which constitutes a baseline from which
we depart to account for the uncertainty over the parameter values. We com-
piled quarterly data from 1997 until 2003 from a variety of sources, including
Eurostat, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Financial
Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund.
In choosing the sample period for this analysis, there is clearly a trade oﬀ.
The longer the time span considered, the more one underestimates the impact
that in the last decade structural reforms and recent changes in the monetary
policy framework of NMs have had. The shorter the time span, the more
one runs into potential distortions of the results due to changes in cyclical
conditions. We have therefore opted for a compromise solution, by computing
sample averages and applying in some cases a limited degree of judgmental
assessment.
We decided to exclude data before 1997, since before then NMs experi-
enced a sizeable fall in output while in￿ation stood at relatively high levels.
Both these aspects do not seem very representative of the current situation, as
the initial phase of restructuring is over, while the monetary policy framework
of many countries has changed remarkably since then. Taking averages over
Michele Ca' Zorzi and Roberto De Santis
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procedure is clearly rough; and it is also clear that convergence is a dynamic
process whereby the parameters of the model may continue to change. There-
fore the benchmark is only a starting point and various alternative scenarios
must be considered to get an insight of the magnitude of the eﬀects.
The ￿rst two columns report average in￿ation and output growth of NMs.
As explained above we interpret these numbers as expected in￿ation and the
natural rate of output respectively, which are needed to compute  and .
In the third column we report . This measure is proxied by taking the
diﬀerence between the growth rate which would allow a rapid convergence
and the natural rate of output. Rapid growth is here de￿ned as the rate
necessary for NMs￿ per-capita GDP to catch up twenty percentage points as
a percentage of euro area per capita GDP in the next ten years.11 Finally, in
this numerical example, we assume that ∗ is equal to 1.5.12
In the fourth column we have computed the average real exchange rate
appreciation of the euro vis-a-vis the currencies of NMs over the same sample
period (HICP based). In the ￿fth and sixth column, we report computed GDP
weights both in nominal terms and PPP.
With reference to the slopes of the Phillips curve, we have set 
 =1 6,
hence making the implicit assumption that output is more responsive than
prices in the euro area. Some recent evidence supports this hypothesis. For
example, a recent empirical study by van Els, et al. (2002) presents some
10I nt h ec a s eo ft h eC z e c hR e p u b l i ca n dR o m a n i a ,w eh a v er e s t r i c t e dt h es a m p l ef o rG D P
from 2000 onwards in view of the severe downturns at the beginning of the sample period.
In the case of Bulgaria, although the currency board was introduced in July 1997, very high
in￿ation persisted for almost one year longer. To get a representative trend for the dynamics
of output and in￿ation in this country, we have considered data starting from 1999.
11Sensitivity analysis on the convergence gap parameter has been carried out. The overall
results suggest that the scenarios are robust for any plausible values of .
12We have also carried out an alternative numerical exercise, which assumes that 
∗ is
higher in ACs. Under this hypothesis, the credibility channel would play a smaller role in
explaining the in￿ation diﬀerential with respect to the euro area. Therefore, the in￿ation
and output responses to shocks would be numerically diﬀerent in the ￿exible exchange rate
regime. The other numerical results of the paper ￿ in particular the case of enlargement -
w o u l dr e m a i nu n c h a n g e d .
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amining four alternative methodologies, which are: (1) a vector autoregressive
model, (2) a structural model for the euro area, (3) an aggregate of euro area
national central banks structural models, (4) and a macro model estimated
by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research. All four empirical
approaches suggest that if the time horizon spans over two years, the output
response to changes in monetary policy is between 1.8 and 6 times larger than
the price response. Less clear-cut is the result if the horizon spans over three
years, as the output response is, depending on the model, in the range between
0.4 and 1.9 times the price response. Therefore, the value we have chosen for
the slope of the Phillips curve implicitly collocates our time horizon in the
range between 2 and 3 years after the shock.
As for the slopes of the Phillips curve in NMs, we are not aware of any
major attempt in the literature to estimate the Phillips curves for all countries
on a comparable basis. In light of this uncertainty, we have thus decided to
conduct a sensitivity analysis by considering three alternative values for 

making the assumption that the responsiveness of output relative to prices is
twice as great as in the euro area, (
 =3 2) the same, (
 =1 6) or half
(
 =0 8).
 is then computed, so that the observed value of endogenous variables









where the tilde represents the computed parameter, while the nil denotes the
initial value of the associated variable. The results are reported in the last
three columns of the table, under the assumption that 	 =0 5.Ar e l a t i v e l y
high parameter  suggests that the in￿ation rate has been kept at a relatively
low level in those countries relative to the level of the structural parameter
. It is higher in the case of Latvia, because this country has been pegging
its exchange rate to the IMF Special Drawing Rights since 1994, a strategy
which has been consistent with low average in￿ation. This case is not explic-
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for this country. Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania have adopted a currency
board regime. Therefore,  cannot be computed in their case, as they are
￿importing￿ the credibility of the euro area monetary framework. As far as
the euro area is concerned, the lack of an in￿ation bias breaks the link between
 and . Therefore, the cost of in￿a t i o nr e l a t i v et ot h a to fo u t p u to ft h ee u r o
area can only be computed by taking the relative variance between in￿ation









The model developed in the previous sections allows us to examine a number of
scenarios assessing the impact of enlargement. In Table 2 we start by reporting
the ￿rst set of simulations in the pre-Maastricht phase, which can be seen as
the benchmark.
The ratios b b  and b b  measure the responsiveness of in￿ation and
output to a one percent positive supply shock For example, in the case of the
euro area we ￿nd that in￿ation falls by 0.38 while output increases by 0.39
percentage points. To get some insights on NMs, we repeat the same exercise
in succession for the three diﬀerent values of 
. If the supply structure
of NMs is the same as for the euro area, i.e. 
 =1 6,t h e nN M sw i t h
￿exible exchange rates stabilise supply shocks sizeably more than countries
with currency boards.13
Carrying out a sensitivity analysis across the three diﬀerent values of 
,
we ￿nd that the steeper the Phillips curve in NMs (hence the smaller 
)




 as in this case (see Table 1), in terms of in￿ation. For countries
13Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania￿s response is identical to the euro area, only when the
supply structure is the same.
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terms only.
In the Maastricht phase, NMs experience a process of nominal disin￿ation.
As we discussed earlier, in response to supply shocks, the impact on in￿ation
and output becomes basically the same as for the three countries that have
a currency board. Conversely, real exchange rate shocks cannot be stabilised
under the currency board, while they are fully absorbed by changes in the
nominal exchange rate under Maastricht.14
Turning to the case of enlargement, the loss function of the euro area
is modi￿ed to account for the new countries participating to the currency
union. As monetary policy takes account of the state of the economy in the
enlarged monetary union as a whole, the weight of each country depends on
its GDP share. As it can be seen from Table 3, we aggregate countries either
using nominal GDP in euro (to capture the weight of NMs in the enlarged
euro area today) or employing GDP in PPP (to capture the weight NMs
will progressively get closer to as the catching up process continues). Both
scenarios assume that the common monetary policy is characterised by the
same preferences as before enlargement, namely  =  =1 66.
Let us suppose that the desire of NMs to converge faster does not aﬀect
the Eurosystem monetary strategy. Then, 	 =0and expected in￿ation in
the enlarged euro area would remain constant. Under the alternative (upper
bound) hypothesis that 	 =1the rise in expected in￿ation in the enlarged
euro area would be between 0.15 and 0.39 percentage points depending on the
weights and the slopes of the Phillips curves.
As we found in the theoretical section, the distribution of in￿ation across
countries depends on the real appreciation and size of each NMs. To gauge
14The model makes the simply￿ng assumption that shocks are suﬃciently small to be
accomodated within ERM II.
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line with most estimates of the BS eﬀect (Halpern and Wyploz, 2001; Kovacs,
2002; Egert, 2003), between 1.5 and 3%; while in the third column we assume
that  is equal to the average pace of appreciation between 1997 and 2003
(see Table 3).
The numerical results indicate that the impact on steady state in￿ation
of the current euro area is limited (between 0.1 and 0.2%) if participating
countries are weighted on the basis of nominal GDP. The de￿ationary impact
on the euro area is instead more sizeable (between 0.2 and 0.4%), if GDP of
NMs are weighted in terms of purchasing power parity. The size of the im-
pact is clearly also an increasing function of the pace of real exchange rate
appreciation in NMs. As shown in Table 1, in the period under review the
average appreciation of the real exchange rate was stronger than the 3 per-
cent threshold in 6 NMs out of 10. This does not mean necessarily, however,
that trend will continue to prevail over the long term, as it may partly be a
re￿ection of the undervaluation phase which characterised the early years of
transition. Nevertheless, it underscores how a stronger pace of appreciation
than suggested by the BS may prevail over a relatively long period of time.
Indeed, 7 years of data are not suﬃcient to net out the possible impact of
cyclical factors. The case of Poland is indicative, as the annual rate of real
exchange rate appreciation has dropped from above 6% per annum between
1997 and 2001, to less than 2% between 1997 and 2003. To summarise, this
analysis has shown how the impact on the current euro area is limited, if the
upward pressure is postulated to be in line with most estimates of the BS ef-
fect. The de￿ationary impact on the euro area might be instead more sizeable
if NMs are weighted in terms of purchasing power parities and a stronger real
exchange rate appreciation process is assumed.
How would the new currency area be aﬀected by symmetric supply shocks?
For the enlarged euro area as a whole the results are robust irrespective of the
The Eastward Enlargement of the European Union
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 (see Table 4). Indeed, the impact on in￿ation and output in the
enlarged currency area in response to symmetric shocks is similar to those of
the euro area before enlargement. The eﬀects for NMs are much more similar
to the case where they would adopt a currency board regime than that of
￿exible exchange rates. This is not surprising, considering the relatively low
weight of NMs in the aggregate measure of in￿ation and output. As was the
case for currency boards, in￿ation and output stabilisation in NMs is thus
sensitive to 
.I n p a r t i c u l a r , w h e n 
 =3 2, a positive symmetric supply
shock on the enlarged euro area would have a considerable impact on output
in NMs.
To examine the impact of country-speci￿c shocks, suppose that an identical
shock takes place in all NMs contemporaneously and that no shock occurs in
the euro area. The impact of a scenario such as this on the enlarged currency
area would be quite limited (see Table 4). But on the countries subject to
the shock the impact would be very large, irrespective of 
, as the degree of
output stabilisation turns out to be extremely small.
Table 4 allows us also to get some insights on the impact of real exchange
rate shocks. Here again the impact on the enlarged euro area is in general
limited (while the sign is ambiguous as it depends on 
 − 
)a n di tt e n d s
to be rather large for the NMs. For example, an unexpected real exchange
appreciation in NMs would result into higher in￿ation and a temporary boost
to NMs￿ economies;15 whereas it would have only a small de￿ationary impact
to the current euro area.
In summary, shocks persisting after enlargement may be problematic for
the new entrants, and to a smaller extent for the union. Therefore, in assessing
15T h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect on competitiveness, which may oﬀset the positive impact on output
growth, is outside the scope of this model.
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is a crucial one. The greater the fall in the variance of supply and real exchange
rate shocks after enlargement, the stronger the positive impact on welfare for
both NMs and the union. Indeed, it is striking how many countries currently
participating in the euro area monetary union, including those with a relatively
low GDP per capita, have observed in the course of the 90s a sizeable fall in the
variance of in￿ation and output. Monetary union and the associated process of
convergence may well have been important factors behind these developments.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper, we have attempted to assess the economic implications of an
enlargement of the European monetary union to include new Member States
(NMs) of the EU within a simple analytical framework.
In the Maastricht phase, the in￿ation requirement of the Treaty determines
a radical change in the way in￿ationary expectations are formed, consistent
with the rapid achievement of the nominal convergence objective. In other
words, if the reward for joining monetary union is considered to be suﬃciently
high, the convergence gap does not feed into the in￿ationary expectations￿
mechanism.
After enlargement we ￿nd that there is no impact on average in￿ation in
the enlarged euro area via the credibility channel, provided that its monetary
policy is unchanged, and via the anticipated real exchange rate appreciation.
Enlargement in this case simply results in a diﬀerent distribution of in￿ation
across countries. We also ￿nd that unanticipated shocks to the real exchange
rate will aﬀect aggregate in￿ation if the aggregate supply structure diﬀers
from one participating country to the next. In general, the cost of an enlarged
monetary union for each member would depend upon the slopes of the Phillips
curves of all members, the size of its economy, and the variance of country-
speci￿c supply and real exchange rate shocks.
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euro area. The results of the numerical simulations critically depend on the
relatively small size of NMs. For the euro area the impact on steady-state
in￿ation is limited if participating countries are weighted on the basis of their
GDP in national currency and if the upward pressure on the equilibrium real
exchange rate is limited. However, the de￿ationary impact on the euro area
is more sizeable if we assume a strong appreciation of the real exchange rate
and if NMs are weighted in terms of purchasing power parity. The simulations
also con￿rm that the major impact on in￿ation and output stabilisation are
borne by the NMs, and only to a much smaller extent by the euro area and the
enlarged currency union. Sensitivity analysis also indicates that the impact
of symmetric shocks on in￿ation and output in the NMs critically depends on
the slope of the Phillips curve. In particular, if the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy diﬀers among member states, real exchange rate shocks
aﬀect union wide in￿ation.
It should be emphasised that an enlarged monetary union would, in itself,
have several positive eﬀects: it would strengthen economic cohesion, reduce
risk premia, facilitate foreign direct investment and encourage technological
progress. Clearly, the simpli￿ed set-up employed in the present study entirely
omits these important aspects. Finally, this modelling framework may also be
extended to include ￿scal issues, as the delegation of monetary policy could
not entirely solve the time inconsistency problem on the ￿scal front.
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Table 2:  Pre-Maastricht Phase: The Impact of Symmetric Supply  
Shocks on Inflation and Output* 
        
  2 . 3 = a α   2 . 3 = a α   6 . 1 = a α   6 . 1 = a α   8 . 0 = a α   8 . 0 = a α  
        
  i i ε π ˆ ˆ   i i y ε ˆ ˆ   i i ε π ˆ ˆ   i i y ε ˆ ˆ   i i ε π ˆ ˆ   i i y ε ˆ ˆ  
        
Bulgaria  -0.38 -0.22 -0.38 0.39 -0.38 0.69 
Czech Republic  -0.27 0.14 -0.48 0.24 -0.77 0.38 
Estonia  -0.38 -0.22 -0.38 0.39 -0.38 0.69 
Hungary  -0.30 0.04 -0.58 0.07 -1.08 0.13 
Latvia  -0.27 0.14 -0.48 0.24 -0.77 0.38 
Lithuania  -0.38 -0.22 -0.38 0.39 -0.38 0.69 
Poland  -0.29 0.09 -0.53 0.16 -0.91 0.28 
Romania  -0.31 0.02 -0.61 0.03 -1.18 0.06 
Slovak Republic  -0.29 0.07 -0.55 0.12 -0.98 0.22 
Slovenia  -0.30 0.04 -0.58 0.07 -1.08 0.14 
EU12  -0.38 0.39 -0.38 0.39 -0.38 0.39 
        
* percentage points 
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Average Inflation in the Currency Union* ( 0 = u φ ) 
    
  5 . 1 − = a q   3 − = a q   a q  (Table 1) 
   
  GDP in Euro 
 
Bulgaria  1.4 2.8 3.5 
Czech Republic  1.4 2.8 3.4 
Estonia  1.4 2.8 2.8 
Hungary  1.4 2.8 4.1 
Latvia  1.4 2.8 2.5 
Lithuania  1.4 2.8 5.7 
Poland  1.4 2.8 1.7 
Romania  1.4 2.8 5.9 
Slovak Republic  1.4 2.8 4.8 
Slovenia  1.4 2.8 1.1 
EU12  -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
     
    GDP in PPP   
     
Bulgaria  1.3 2.6 3.3 
Czech Republic  1.3 2.6 3.2 
Estonia  1.3 2.6 2.6 
Hungary  1.3 2.6 3.9 
Latvia  1.3 2.6 2.3 
Lithuania  1.3 2.6 5.5 
Poland  1.3 2.6 1.5 
Romania  1.3 2.6 5.7 
Slovak Republic  1.3 2.6 4.6 
Slovenia  1.3 2.6 0.9 
EU12  -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 
 
* percentage points 
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